Transparency
Every Stratum ETL and ingestion run appends a signed record to a hash chain, one chain per source and layer. Each record names the hash of the one before it, so changing, removing or reordering history breaks the chain. Once a day a verifier checks every chain and publishes a signed anchor: the head of each chain at that moment.
Because anchors are public and dated, anyone holding a Stratum audit bundle can check that the records in it were committed to here before they received it. Your browser checks the latest anchor below; nothing is sent anywhere.
Latest anchor
Loading the latest anchor…
| Chain | Records | Status | Head hash |
|---|
Files
- Latest anchor (JSON); dated copies live alongside it at
/transparency/anchors/<timestamp>.jsonand never change. - Signing key, public half (PEM), ECDSA P-256. The private half never leaves AWS KMS.
Verify it yourself
An anchor's anchor_hash is the SHA-256 of its fields
anchor_version, stage, generated_at, previous_anchor_hash,
public_key_sha256, chains as JSON with sorted keys, compact
separators and ASCII escaping. The signature is ECDSA
P-256 with SHA-256 over those same bytes, DER-encoded and hex. Each
anchor names the previous one, so anchors form a chain too.
Anchors bound when a record could have been changed to the day before the anchor that first covered it. Timestamps come from Stratum's own clock; trusted third-party timestamps are on the roadmap.
Audit bundles, with a real FRED example
An audit bundle is a small zip that proves where one Stratum dataset came from and that its record has not been changed since it was anchored here. You check it on your own machine, with no account and no access to Stratum. Here is a real one, followed from the source.
The example is the yield curve signal. Among other series it uses T10Y2Y, the 10-year minus 2-year Treasury spread published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). The values below are copied from records written in our sandbox on 10 October 2026, abridged.
Every run writes a signed record
- SourceFRED API
Series T10Y2Y, daily since 1976
- Bronze · raw copybronze/fred #24
06:02 UTC
13,139 observations fetched, 13,139 stored
API key recorded as REDACTED
- Silver · cleanedsilver/fred #5
07:54 UTC
109,928 rows in (every FRED series), 106,813 out
- Gold · signalgold/fred #5
07:58 UTC
81,019 rows in, 26,399 out to the yield_curve table
Records link into a chain, and the chain is anchored here
- gold/fred #4
07:30 UTC · 26,399 rows
prev 2280f2b9…
hash ea129188…
- gold/fred #5
07:58 UTC · 26,399 rows
prev ea129188…
hash 272835e5…
- Published on this pageAnchor, 10 Oct 2026 10:00 UTC
gold/fred head: #5 272835e5…
plus the heads of 21 other chains, signed
Checking the anchor published on 10 October 2026…
The bundle packs all of it into one zip
Suppose you used the yield curve from run #4 and want proof. We export the bundle for gold/fred #4: a 10 KB zip of 8 files.
records/…004.jsonRun #4, the record you asked about, with its signaturerecords/…005.jsonEvery later record up to the anchored head (here #5), so the link to the anchor can be checkedanchor.jsonThe signed anchor of 10 Oct 10:00 UTC that names #5 as the headpublic-key.pemThe public half of the signing key; it should be the same key as oursinputs-inventory.jsonThe silver files under the run's input, listed when the bundle was builtmanifest.jsonWhat the bundle covers, and the SHA-256 of every other fileverify_bundle.pyThe verifier: one readable Python file, about 180 linesVERIFY.mdHow to run it
Anyone can check it, offline
$ pip install cryptography
$ python verify_bundle.py verify-bundle stratum-bundle-gold-fred-4.zip
Bundle: stratum-bundle-gold-fred-4.zip
Target: gold/fred seq 4 (lineage_id eb376cb4-9d4b-48fd-b124-3173f94d9b36)
Records checked: 2
VERIFIED: hashes, chain links, signatures and anchor all check out. It then helps to try to cheat. We edited copies of that same bundle, and this is what the verifier said:
| What we changed | What the verifier reported |
|---|---|
| Record #5's row count, 26,399 to 26,400 | records/…005.json: SHA-256 does not match the manifest seq 5: content does not match its entry_hash |
| The same, and the manifest patched to match | seq 5: content does not match its entry_hash |
| Record #5 deleted | records/…005.json: listed in the manifest but missing the last record is not the chain head the anchor commits to |
Recomputing the hash does not help: a new hash needs a new signature, and only our KMS key can make one. Someone could still forge a whole bundle with their own key and their own anchor. The verifier only checks a bundle against itself, so it would pass. The last check is yours: compare the bundle's public-key.pem with our signing key, and its anchor_hash with the dated copy published here that morning, 2026-10-10T100006Z.json. The box under step 2 does that comparison for this example.
What a bundle does not prove
- That FRED's numbers are right. It proves what we recorded about our runs, and that the record has not changed since.
- The exact input files. Inputs are recorded as folders; the inventory is listed when the bundle is built, not when the run happened.
- Which code version ran. The field exists but reads unknown for now.
Bundles are exported on request today; there is no self-service download yet.